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In	Latin	America	as	in	the	wider	world,	corruption	is
rooted	in	our	relationships
Acknowledging	that	cooperation	and	corruption	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin	can	help	us	to
understand	why	some	states	succeed	and	others	fail,	why	some	oscillate,	and	which	triggers	lead
failed	states	to	succeed	and	successful	states	to	fail,	writes	Michael	Muthukrishna	(LSE
Psychological	and	Behavioural	Science).
There	is	nothing	natural	about	democracy	[1].	There	is	nothing	natural	about	living	in	communities
with	complete	strangers.	There	is	nothing	natural	about	large-scale	anonymous	cooperation.	Yet,
this	morning,	I	bought	a	coffee	from	Starbucks	with	no	fear	of	being	poisoned	or	cheated.	I	caught	a	train	on
London’s	underground	packed	with	people	I’ve	never	met	before	and	will	probably	never	meet	again.	If	we	were
commuting	chimps	in	a	space	that	small,	it	would	have	been	a	scene	out	of	the	latest	Planet	of	the	Apes	by	the
time	we	reached	Holborn	station.	We’ll	return	to	this	mystery	in	a	moment.
Family-oriented	cultures	like	those	in	Latin	America	are	also	high	on	corruption,	particularly
nepotism	(Tio	Feli,	CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
There	is	something	very	natural	about	prioritising	your	family	over	other	people.	There	is	something	very	natural
about	helping	your	friends	and	others	in	your	social	circle.	And	there	is	something	very	natural	about	returning
favors	given	to	you.	These	are	all	smaller	scales	of	cooperation	that	we	share	with	other	animals	and	that	are	well
described	by	the	math	of	evolutionary	biology.	The	trouble	is	that	these	smaller	scales	of	cooperation	can
undermine	the	larger-scale	cooperation	of	modern	states.	Although	corruption	is	often	thought	of	as	a	falling	from
grace,	a	challenge	to	the	normal	functioning	state	—	it’s	in	the	etymology	of	the	word	—	it’s	perhaps	better
understood	as	the	flip	side	of	cooperation.	One	scale	of	cooperation,	typically	the	one	that’s	smaller	and	easier	to
sustain,	undermines	another.
When	a	leader	gives	his	daughter	a	government	contract,	it’s	nepotism.	But	it’s	also	cooperation	at	the	level	of
the	family,	well	explained	by	inclusive	fitness	[2],	undermining	cooperation	at	the	level	of	the	state.	When	a
manager	gives	her	friend	a	job,	it’s	cronyism.	But	it’s	also	cooperation	at	the	level	of	friends,	well	explained	by
reciprocal	altruism	[3],	undermining	the	meritocracy.	Bribery	is	a	cooperative	act	between	two	people,	and	so	on.
It’s	no	surprise	that	family-oriented	cultures	like	Mexico	and	Brazil	are	also	high	on	corruption,	particularly
nepotism.
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Even	in	the	Western	world,	it’s	no	surprise	that	Australia,	a	country	of	mates,	might	be	susceptible	to	cronyism.
Or	that	breaking	down	kin	networks	predicts	lower	corruption	and	more	successful	democracies.	Part	of	the
problem	is	that	these	smaller	scales	of	cooperation	are	easier	to	sustain	and	explain	than	the	kind	of	large-scale
anonymous	cooperation	that	we	in	the	Western	world	have	grown	accustomed	to.
The	role	of	culture	and	institutions
So	how	is	it	that	some	states	prevent	these	smaller	scales	of	cooperation	from	undermining	large-scale
anonymous	cooperation?
The	typical	answer	is	that	more	successful	nations	have	better	institutions.	All	that’s	required	is	the	right	set	of
rules	to	make	society	function.	But	even	on	the	face	of	it,	this	answer	seems	incomplete.	If	it	were	true,	Liberia,
which	borrowed	more	than	its	flag	from	the	United	States,	ought	to	be	much	more	successful	than	it	is	[4].
Instead,	these	institutions	are	supported	by	invisible	cultural	pillars	without	which	the	institutions	would	fail.
For	example,	without	a	belief	in	rule	of	law	—	that	the	law	applies	to	all	and	cannot	be	changed	on	the	whim	of
the	leader	—	it	doesn’t	matter	what	the	constitution	or	legal	code	says,	no	one	is	listening.	Without	a	long	time
horizon,	decisions	are	judged	on	how	well	they	serve	our	immediate	needs	making	larger-scale	projects,	like
reducing	the	effects	of	Climate	Change,	harder	to	justify	[5].
Similarly,	institutions	often	lack	the	punitive	power	to	actually	punish	perpetrators.	For	example,	most	people	in
the	US	and	UK	pay	their	taxes,	even	though	in	reality	the	IRS	and	Her	Majesty’s	Revenue	and	Customs	lack	the
power	to	prosecute	widespread	non-compliance;	your	probability	of	getting	caught	is	low.	The	tax	compliant
majority	may	never	discover	that	they	can	cheat	or	how	to	get	away	with	it	and	they	may	not	actively	seek	this
information	as	long	as	the	probability	of	getting	caught	is	non-zero,	the	system	seems	fair,	and	it	seems	like
everyone	else	is	complying.	Or	in	other	words,	it’s	a	combination	of	norms	and	institutions.
Not	everyone	plays	by	the	same	rules	when	it	comes	to	taxes	(Tom	Hilton,	CC	BY	2.0)
But,	it	gets	tricky	—	institutions	are	themselves	hardened	or	codified	norms	[6]	and	the	norms	themselves	evolve
in	response	to	the	present	environment	and	due	to	path-dependence	of	previous	environments,	past	decisions,
and	the	places	migrants	come	from.	Modern	groups	vary	on	individualism	and	even	sexist	attitudes	based	on
their	ancestors’	farming	practices	[7].	The	science	of	cultural	evolution	describes	the	evolution	of	these	norms	and
introduces	the	possibility	of	out-of-equilibria	behavior	(people	behaving	in	ways	that	do	not	benefit	them
individually)	for	long	enough	for	institutions	to	try	to	stabilise	the	new	equilibria.
LSE Latin America and Caribbean Blog: In Latin America as in the wider world, corruption is rooted in our relationships Page 2 of 6
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-10-23
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2017/10/23/in-latin-america-as-in-the-wider-world-corruption-is-rooted-in-our-relationships/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/
Modelling	cooperation	and	corruption
How	do	we	begin	to	understand	these	processes?
The	real	world	is	messy	and	before	we	start	running	randomised	control	trials	or	preparing	case	studies,	it’s
useful	to	model	the	basic	dynamics	of	cooperation	using	a	simpler	form	that	gets	at	the	core	elements	of	the
challenge.	One	commonly	used	model	is	called	the	“Public	Goods	Game”.	The	gist	of	the	game	is	that	I	give	you,
and	say	9	others,	$10.	Whatever	you	put	into	a	pool	(the	public	good),	I’ll	multiply	by	say	3,	but	then	I’ll	divide	the
money	equally	regardless	of	contribution.	This	is	similar	to	paying	your	taxes	for	public	goods	that	we	all	benefit
from,	like	roads,	clean	water,	or	environmental	protections.
The	dilemma	is	this:	the	best	move	is	for	everyone	to	put	all	their	money	in	the	pool.	Then	they’ll	all	go	home	with
$30.	But	it’s	in	my	best	interests	to	put	nothing	in	the	pool	and	let	everyone	else	put	their	money	in.	If	I	put	in
nothing	and	they	put	in	$10	each,	I’ll	go	home	with	almost	$40	($10*9*3	people	/	10	=	$37).	What	happens	when
we	play	this	game?
Well,	if	we	play	it	in	a	Western	Educated	Industrialised	Rich	Democratic	(WEIRD)	nation,	where	prosocial	norms
tend	to	be	higher,	people	put	about	half	their	money	in,	but	as	they	gradually	realise	they	can	make	more	by
putting	in	less,	contributions	dwindle	to	zero.	One	way	to	sustain	contributions	is	to	introduce	peer	punishment	—
allow	people	to	spend	some	portion	of	their	money	to	punish	other	people.	This	is	similar	to	the	kind	of
punishment	we	might	see	in	a	small	village.	I	know	who	you	are	or	at	least	I	know	your	parents	or	people	you
know.	If	you	steal	my	crops,	I’ll	punish	you	myself	or	ruin	your	reputation.In	the	game,	if	we	introduce	the
possibility	of	peer	punishment,	contributions	rise	again.
The	problem	is	that	this	doesn’t	scale	well.	As	the	number	of	people	grows,	we	get	second-order	free-riding	—
people	prefer	to	let	someone	else	pay	the	cost	of	punishment.	When	someone	cuts	a	queue,	you	grumble	—
someone	ought	to	tell	that	person	off!	Someone	other	than	me…	And	you	can	also	get	counter-punishment	—
revenge	for	being	punished.
The	best	solution	seems	to	be	to	create	a	punishment	institution.	Pick	one	person	as	a	“Leader”	and	allow	them
to	extract	taxes	that	can	be	used	to	punish	free-riders.	This	works	really	well	and	scales	up	nicely.	It’s	similar	to	a
functioning	police	force	and	judiciary	in	WEIRD	nations.	In	fact,	the	models	suggest	that	the	more	power	you	give
to	the	leader,	the	more	cooperation	they	can	sustain.	Aha,	problem	solved!
Not	quite.	Models	like	these	are	very	useful	for	distilling	the	core	of	a	phenomenon,	they	can	miss	things.	Recall
where	we	started	—	smaller-scales	of	cooperation	can	undermine	the	larger-scale.
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The	addition	of	a	punishment	institution,	like	a	judiciary,	can	improve	cooperation	(Jeff	Kubina,
public	domain)
Getting	into	—	and	out	of	—	the	Bribery	Game
In	our	recently	published	paper,	we	wanted	to	show	just	how	easy	it	was	to	break	that	well-functioning	institution.
We	did	it	by	introducing	the	possibility	of	another	very	simple	form	of	cooperation	—	you	scratch	my	back,	I’ll
scratch	yours	—	bribery.	And	then	we	wanted	to	show	the	power	of	invisible	cultural	pillars	by	measuring	people’s
cultural	background	and	by	trying	to	fix	corruption	using	common	anti-corruption	strategies.	We	wanted	to	show
that	these	strategies,	including	transparency,	don’t	work	in	all	contexts	and	can	even	backfire.
Our	“Bribery	Game”	was	the	usual	institutional	punishment	public	goods	game	with	the	punishing	leader,	but	with
one	additional	choice	—	players	could	not	only	keep	money	for	themselves	or	contribute	to	the	public	pool,	they
could	also	contribute	to	the	leader.	And	the	leader	could	not	only	punish	or	not	punish,	they	could	instead	accept
that	contribution.	What	happened?	On	average,	we	saw	contributions	fall	by	25%	compared	to	the	game	without
bribery	as	an	option.	More	than	double	what	the	pound	has	fallen	against	the	USD	since	Brexit	(~12%[8]).
Fine,	bribery	is	costly.	The	World	Bank	estimates	$1	trillion	is	paid	in	bribes	alone;	in	Kenya,	8	out	of	10
interactions	with	public	officials	involves	a	bribe,	and	as	Manfred	Milinski	points	out	in	his	summary	of	our	paper,
most	of	humanity	—	6	billion	people	—	live	in	nations	with	high	levels	of	corruption.	Our	model	also	reveals	that
unlike	the	typical	institutional	punishment	public	goods	game,	where	stronger	institutions	mean	that	more
cooperation	can	be	sustained,	when	bribery	is	an	option,	stronger	institutions	mean	more	bribery.	A	small	bribe
multiplied	by	the	number	of	players	will	make	you	a	lot	richer	than	your	share	of	the	public	good!
So	can	we	fix	it?	The	usual	answer	is	transparency.	There	are	also	some	interesting	approaches,	like	tying	a
leader’s	salary	to	the	country’s	GDP	—	the	Singaporean	model	[9].	So	what	happened	when	we	introduced	these
strategies?
Well,	when	the	public	goods	multiplier	was	high	(economic	potential	—	potential	to	make	money	using	legitimate
means	—	was	high)	or	the	institution	had	power	to	punish,	then	contributions	went	up.	Not	to	levels	without
bribery	as	an	option,	but	higher.	But	in	poor	contexts	with	weak	punishing	institutions,	transparency	had	no	effect
or	backfired.	As	did	the	Singaporean	model	[10].	Why?
When	transparency	confirms	corruption
Consider	what	transparency	does.	It	tells	us	what	people	are	doing.	But	as	psychological	and	cultural
evolutionary	research	reveals,	this	solves	a	common	knowledge	problem	and	reveals	the	descriptive	norm	—
what	people	are	doing.	For	it	to	have	any	hope	of	changing	behavior,	we	need	a	prescriptive	or	proscriptive	norm
against	corruption.	Without	this,	transparency	just	reinforces	that	everyone	is	accepting	bribes	and	you’d	be	a	fool
not	to.
People	who	have	lived	in	corrupt	countries	will	have	felt	this	frustration	first	hand.	There’s	a	sense	that	it’s	not
about	bad	apples	—	the	society	is	broken	in	ways	that	are	sometimes	difficult	to	articulate.	But	societal	norms	are
not	arbitrary.	They	are	adapted	to	the	local	environment	and	influenced	by	historical	contexts.	In	our	experiment,
the	parameters	created	the	environment.	If	there	really	is	no	easy	way	to	legitimately	make	money	and	the	state
doesn’t	have	the	power	to	punish	free-riders,	then	bribery	really	is	the	right	option.
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Sometimes	even	Canadians	go	bad…	(Frank	Winkler,	CC0)
So	even	among	Canadians,	admittedly	some	of	the	nicest	people	in	the	world,	in	these	in-game	parameters,
corruption	was	difficult	to	eradicate.	When	the	country	is	poor	and	the	state	has	no	power,	transparency	doesn’t
tell	you	not	to	pay	a	bribe,	it	solves	a	different	problem	—	it	tells	you	the	price	of	the	bribe.	Not	“should	I	pay”,	but
“how	much”?
There	were	some	other	nuances	to	the	experiment	that	deserve	follow	up.	If	we	had	played	the	game	in	the
Colombia	instead	of	Canada,	we	suspect	baseline	bribery	would	have	been	higher.	Indeed,	people	with	direct
exposure	to	corruption	norms	encouraged	more	corruption	in	the	game	controlling	for	ethnic	background.	And
those	with	an	ethnic	background	that	included	more	corruption	countries,	but	without	direct	exposure	were
actually	better	cooperators	than	the	3rd	generation+	Canadians.	These	results	may	reveal	some	of	the	effects	of
migration	and	historical	path	dependence.
Of	course,	great	caution	is	required	in	applying	these	results	to	the	messiness	of	the	real	world.	We	hope	to
further	investigate	these	cultural	patterns	in	future	work.	The	experiment	also	reveals	that	corruption	may	be	quite
high	in	developed	countries,	but	its	costs	aren’t	as	easily	felt.	Leaders	in	richer	nations	like	the	United	States	may
accept	“bribes”	in		the	form	of	lobbying	or	campaign	funding	and	these	may	indeed	be	costly	for	the	efficiency	of
the	economy,	but	it	may	be	the	difference	between	a	city	building	25	or	20	schools.	In	a	poor	country	similar
corruption	may	be	the	difference	between	a	city	building	three	schools	or	one.	Five	is	more	than	three,	but	three
is	three	times	more	than	one.	In	a	rich	nation,	the	cost	of	corruption	may	be	larger	in	absolute	value,	but	in	a
poorer	nation,	it	may	be	larger	in	relative	value	and	felt	more	acutely.
New	approaches,	new	insights
The	take-home	is	that	cooperation	and	corruption	are	two	sides	of	the	same	coin;	different	scales	of	cooperation
competing.	This	approach	gives	us	a	powerful	theoretical	and	empirical	toolkit	for	developing	a	framework	for
understanding	corruption,	why	some	states	succeed	and	others	fail,	why	some	oscillate,	and	the	triggers	that	may
lead	to	failed	states	succeeding	and	successful	states	failing.
Our	cultural	evolutionary	biases	lead	us	to	look	for	whom	to	learn	from	and	perhaps	whom	to	avoid.	They	lead	us
to	blame	individuals	for	corruption.	But	just	as	atrocities	are	the	acts	of	many	humans	cooperating	toward	an	evil
end,	corruption	is	a	feature	of	a	society	not	individuals.	Indeed,	corruption	is	arguably	easier	to	understand	than
my	fearless	acceptance	of	my	anonymous	barista’s	coffee.
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Our	tendency	to	favour	those	who	share	copies	of	our	genes	—	a	tendency	all	animals	share	—	leads	to	both
love	of	family	and	nepotism.	Putting	our	buddies	before	others	is	as	ancient	as	our	species,	but	it	creates
inefficiencies	in	a	meritocracy.
Innovations	are	often	the	result	of	applying	well-established	approaches	in	one	area	to	the	problems	of	another.
We	hope	the	science	of	cooperation	and	cultural	evolution	will	give	us	new	tools	in	combating	corruption.
Footnotes:
[1]	Putting	aside	what	it	means	for	something	to	be	natural	for	our	species,	suffice	to	say	these	are	recent
inventions	in	our	evolutionary	history,	by	no	means	culturally	universal,	and	not	shared	by	our	closest	cousins.
[2]	Genes	that	identify	and	favor	copies	of	themselves	will	spread.
[3]	Helping	those	who	help	you.
[4]	The	United	Nations	Human	Development	Index	ranks	the	United	States	10th	in	the	world.	Liberia	is	177th.
[5]	Temporal	discounting	is	the	degree	to	which	we	value	the	future	less	than	the	present.	Our	tendency	to	value
the	present	over	the	future	is	one	reason	we	don’t	yet	have	Moon	or	Mars	colonies,	but	the	degree	to	which	we
do	this	varies	from	society	to	society.
[6]	Written	laws	can	serve	a	signaling	and	coordination	function;	rather	than	having	to	interpret	norms	from	the
environment.	When	previously	contentious	norms	are	sufficiently	well	established,	you	may	do	well	to	codify	them
in	law	(legislating	before	they	are	established	might	mean	more	punishment—consider	the	history	of	prohibition	in
the	United	States).
[7]	Not	that	agriculture	is	the	main	reason	for	these	cultural	differences!
[8]	This	doesn’t	upset	me	at	all.
[9]	Singapore’s	leaders	are	the	highest	paid	in	the	world,	but	the	nation	also	has	one	of	the	lowest	corruption
rates	in	the	world—lower	than	the	Netherlands,	Canada,	Germany,	UK,	Australia,	and	United	States	[source:
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016].
[10]	Note,	there	are	some	conceptual	issues	that	make	interpretation	of	the	Singaporean	treatment	ambiguous.
We	discuss	this	in	the	supplementary.	We’ll	have	to	further	explore	this	in	a	future	study.	Such	is	science.
General	notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	This	article	draws	on	Corrupting	cooperation	and	how	anti-corruption	strategies	may	backfire	(Nature,	2017)
•	This	is	a	slightly	modified	version	of	an	article	originally	published	at	Evonomics
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
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